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The important role that the Mediterranean played in England’s 
development as an imperial power in the early modern period has begun 
to be appreciated, but more work is required to properly historicize the 
interactions which occurred during this time and understand their impact. 
This article argues that to do this it is necessary to move beyond generalized 
interpretations and examine the impact of encounter at the individual 
level. Moreover, through examining the experiences of one such sojourner, 
it demonstrates how a focus on acculturative change can provide novel 
insights into the consequences of historical encounters between European 
and non-European peoples.
The Mediterranean has long been sidelined in the narrative of British commercial 
and political expansion. But over the past two decades the sea has once again 
began attracting the attention of scholars, who are not only affirming the continuity 
of its historical importance as a meeting place for competing states and cultures, 
and a centre for trade and commerce, but also the significant contribution it made 
to British culture, national identity, and imperial development during the early 
modern period.1 Understanding the experience of Britons in the Mediterranean is 
important, not only in terms of illuminating Britain’s naval, political, and economic 
history, but also to understanding the nation’s social and cultural development. 
More generally though, as one scholar has observed, the Mediterranean provides 
an ‘excellent laboratory’ in which to explore the issues of identity, cultures, and the 
interaction of individuals and groups under conditions of both peace and conflict.2
However, among the first to reappraise the role of the Mediterranean in the 
shaping of British history were not cultural historians but rather literary scholars 
examining how depictions of Muslims in early modern English plays and literature 
1  Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850 (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2004), pp. 33–35; Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689 (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2006), p. ix; Tristan M. Stein, ʻThe Mediterranean in the English 
Empire of Trade, 1660–1678’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 2012), 
pp. 8, 13.
2  Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence 
in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 2. 
Dursteler notes that while much of the important earlier work on the encounter of Europeans 
with other cultures has been situated in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, attention is now being 
given to the Mediterranean. 
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reflected contemporary understanding of ethnic and racial difference. Much of 
this work is post-colonial in nature, informed by Edward Said’s conception of a 
Western Orientalist discourse, and attempts to establish a connection between the 
construction of the cultural and ethnic Other and processes of conquest and empire 
building.3 Preoccupation with Saidian notions of power and hegemony, and of 
associated colonial and imperial discourses continue to inform the methodologies 
of studies of the contact of Britons with the region in the early modern period.
Literary scholars have also been influential in drawing attention to another 
aspect of the early modern Mediterranean which has, arguably, wider historical 
significance, and that is the phenomenon of Christian European captivity and 
enslavement by Muslim privateers—more generally referred to as ‘corsairs’ 
in the context of the Mediterranean—operating from the coast of North Africa 
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Accounts left by the victims—so-
called Barbary captivity narratives4—provide a rich, but at times interpretively 
problematic, source of historic detail derived from the author’s or the narrator’s 
intimate, often traumatic, engagement with Barbary. However, captivity narratives 
do reinforce the fact that for many Europeans Barbary was more than an 
imaginative construct, it was a lived reality, often involuntary, and experienced in 
a multiplicity of ways.5 
While relations between Christian Europe and the Islamicate6 societies of 
North Africa during the early modern period have began to attract increasing 
3  Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 8–12. A. G. Hopkins comments on the general ‘mass 
conversion of newcomers from literary studies’ to colonial studies that occurred as a result of the 
influence of post-modernism. See Hopkins, ʻDevelopment of the Utopian Ideal, 1960–1999’, in 
The Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. by Wm. Roger Louis and others, 5 vols (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998–99), v: Historiography, ed. by Robin W. Winks (1999), pp. 638–
52 (p. 648).
4  ‘Barbary’ was adopted by early modern Britons to denote the area which roughly 
encompasses the modern-day states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, whose peoples 
share similar ethno-linguistic identity, cultural traditions and religious institutions. It was 
traditionally known to Arabs as the Maghrib (or Maghreb), the ‘Land of Sunset’. See Jamil M. 
Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), pp. 1, 4; Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 3. Scholars commonly use Barbary and 
North Africa as generally synonymous toponyms. While this is not strictly incorrect, as there is 
no single accepted definition, both Egypt and Sudan are now commonly considered to be part of 
North Africa. The area generally associated with Barbary could more precisely be referred to as 
Northwest Africa, but in the interests of consistency with the general literature it is referred to as 
North Africa in this article.
5  Robert C. Davis has estimated that at least one million people were captured from 
vessels and coastal areas of the Mediterranean, the British Isles, and as far north as Iceland 
between 1530 and 1780. However, it has been argued that these figures are excessive, and 
even Davis is circumspect about the reliability of the sources on which they are based. See 
Davis, ʻCounting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast’, Past & Present, 172.1 (2001), 87–124 
(pp. 96–97, 118); Nabil Matar, British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563–
1760 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 9–11.
6  As with ‘Islamdom’, the historian Marshall G. S. Hodgson coined this term to 
overcome the general tendency toward casual conflation of the religion with the social structures 
and cultural traditions with which it has been historically associated. He thus restricted ‘the term 
Parergon 36.1 (2019)
133A Case Study of the Acculturation of an Early Modern Briton
interest from scholars, there remains much work to be done to properly historicize 
the interactions of this period, and understand their impact. In this respect, there 
is a fundamental question that remains to be satisfactorily addressed concerning 
the activities of Britons in North Africa during the seventeenth century, and that 
concerns the effect that their encounters with this part of the world actually had 
on the development of British self-identity, and, by extension, Britain’s imperial 
progression. 
The challenge for anyone seeking to answer this question is to establish a 
clear relationship between cause and effect: to distinguish the particular influence 
that experience in North Africa may have had on shaping the worldview of early 
modern Britons and nurturing imperial and colonial aspiration from the many and 
varied other factors which undoubtedly contributed to this development. For this 
reason, in a departure from previous work on the subject, notably by Linda Colley 
and Nabil Matar,7 the focus of my recent research has not been on generalized 
interpretations, but rather on elucidating a deeper understanding of the impact of 
encounter at the individual level among Britons who had actual lived experience 
in that part of North Africa in which they had the most consistent, and broadest 
range of, relations during the early modern period, Morocco.8
This work has been based on close, contextualized, ‘against-the-grain’ (re)
readings of contemporary sources informed by the principles of psychological 
acculturation and notions concerning the influence of inter-cultural engagement 
more generally on individual learning and behaviour, and wider cultural and 
social development.9 By doing so, I have sought to identify not only the affective, 
“Islam” to the religion of the Muslims, not using that term for the far more general phenomena, 
the society of Islamdom and its Islamicate cultural traditions’. See Hodgson, The Venture of 
Islam, 3 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), i: The Classical Age of Islam, 
pp. 58–59.
7  Matar has been prolific in his studies of relations between early modern Britain, 
Western Europe, and the Islamicate states of the Mediterranean, with his book Britain and 
Barbary of particular relevance to this article, and Linda Colley has provided other novel insights 
through her use of the experiences of Britons held in captivity to reappraise the rise of the British 
Empire in Captives.
8  While Morocco has coasts bordering both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean 
Sea, during the early modern period much of what is now modern-day Morocco was conceived 
of as being part of a geographic and imaginative construct called Barbary which was centred on 
the Mediterranean, not the Atlantic.
9  There is no generally accepted definition of acculturation, but, broadly, it encompasses 
the changes—psychological, social, and cultural—which result when individuals from one 
culture come into contact with another. Space precludes the inclusion of a meaningful discussion 
of cross-cultural psychology and the generally well accepted model for examining psychological 
acculturative change and cultural adaptation experienced by individuals, the ABC model of 
culture shock, which has informed my general approach to analysis of responses in my doctoral 
research. On the former, see John W. Berry and others, Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research 
and Applications, 3rd edn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. pp. 1–4, 324. On 
the latter, see Colleen Ward, Stephen Bochner, and Adrian Furnham, The Psychology of Culture 
Shock, 2nd edn (Hove: Routledge, 2001), esp. pp. 1, 4–5, 80–82, 270–74; Berry and others, 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, pp. 314–15; H. Chad Lane, ʻIntercultural Learning’, in Encyclopedia 
of the Sciences of Learning, ed. by N. M. Seel (New York: Springer, 2012), p. 1619.
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cognitive, and behavioural responses of sojourners to Morocco, but also the 
personal and other proximate factors which influenced those responses, and assess 
the impact that their experiences had on them, and in shaping Anglo-Moroccan 
trade and diplomatic relations more generally. In this article, I apply this broad 
methodological framework to examine one particularly interesting subject, John 
Harrison (d. 1641 × 52), whose story not only reveals the role that religious 
conviction and ideological belief could play in personal acculturation, but also 
demonstrates how a focus on the processes of acculturative change can provide 
novel, more nuanced insights into the consequences of historical encounters 
between European and non-European peoples.
Harrison’s extensive experience as a political agent in Morocco, acquired 
over the course of eight missions he conducted between 1610 and 1632, provided 
him with what appears to have been a sound knowledge of the country’s history, 
society, culture, religious practices, and political structures. One scholar has gone 
as far as describing him as having ‘laid the foundations for England’s commercial 
and ideological relations with Morocco’,10 but this claim cannot be substantiated 
based on the available evidence. England’s commercial relationship with Morocco 
was already well established by the time Harrison appeared, and there is little 
proof of him having had a direct, long-term impact on shaping either English 
geopolitical or commercial thinking about the region. Nevertheless he was, for 
a time, highly regarded, and an important figure in Anglo-Moroccan relations in 
the first third of the seventeenth century, and his life and writings about Morocco 
warrant more attention than they have been given by historians. He is an excellent 
subject for a study of the present kind because of the extended period over which 
he worked in Morocco, the breadth of his experiences there, and the detailed 
accounts and other works that he left.
There is little currently known about Harrison’s early life. He appears to have 
served in the English army in Ireland under Elizabeth I, and upon the accession 
of James I Harrison was appointed to the privy chamber of the king’s son, Prince 
Henry, remaining in that position until Henry’s death in 1612. He then joined the 
retinue of James’s daughter Elizabeth, the Countess Palatine of the Rhine, until 
at least 1619, and was later appointed sheriff, or governor, of the Somers Isles 
(Bermuda), before he once again returned to Morocco.11 The following discussion 
contributes to the limited information currently available on this intriquing figure.
I. Muslim Pirates and English Captives, 1610–16
The Sa‛dian dynasty was established in Morocco in the mid-1500s around the 
same time as England’s trading relations with the country were quickly developing. 
Despite their professed aim of ridding Morocco of Christian Europeans, or at 
10  Nabil Matar, ʻHarrison, John (d. 1641 × 52)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography Online <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12435> [accessed 12 July 2017].
11  Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, 63 vols 
(London: Smith, Elder, 1885–1900), xxv (1891), p. 33, s.v. ʻHarrison, John (fl. 1630)’; Matar, 
ʻHarrison, John’.
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least depriving them of independent activity in the country, the Sa‛dīs adopted a 
pragmatic foreign policy, using trade and shrewd management of relations with 
the European powers to confront both internal and external forces seeking to 
usurp them. Under Elizabeth I and the Sa‛dī sultan Mawlāy Ahmad al-Mansūr, 
England and Morocco had enjoyed a long period of close commercial and political 
relations which had been supported by shared concerns about Spain.12 However, 
with the death of both rulers in 1603, the situation changed as Morocco slid into 
internecine conflict and England politically disengaged with the country following 
the accession of James I. With the loss of a strong central government, corsairs 
operating from Salé on the Atlantic coast took advantage of the situation, quickly 
becoming a source of tension between the two countries, not only due to the 
disruption of English shipping and trade resulting from their predations, but also 
increasingly in response to the capture of crews and passengers, who were either 
held for ransom or sold into captivity; although, notably, it was the grievances of 
English merchants and not the plight of his subjects that first forced James to send 
an envoy to resolve the situation.13
Complaints from Morocco had started being received in London very soon 
after al-Mansūr’s death, expressing concern about the behaviour of the late sultan’s 
son, Abu Faris (r. 1603–09), who controlled Marrakesh. It was claimed that Abu 
Faris had reneged on commitments negotiated by the English with his father, 
and that he was not protecting the interests of the English trading community.14 
Harrison was dispatched and arrived in Morocco in June 1610 to deliver a letter 
from the king to Mawlāy Zaydān, who, having defeated his brother, now ruled 
Marrakesh as well as the territory of Sus to the south. After a long delay Harrison 
was finally invited to present the details of the grievances, but Zaydān refuted the 
claims, advising Harrison that the merchants had breached the laws of his country. 
Consequently, he would not compensate them, but he did confirm the maintenance 
12  On the rise of the Sa‛dīs, see, for example, R. Mantran, ʻNorth Africa in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries’, in The Cambridge History of Islam, ed. by P. M. Holt, Anne K. S. 
Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), ii: The 
Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization, pp. 240–47; Charles-André Julien, The 
History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco: From the Arab Conquest to 1830, trans. 
by John Petrie, ed. by C. C. Stewart (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 213–36; 
Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, pp. 210–18. The dynasty reached its zenith in power and 
ambition under Mawlāy al-Mansūr, on which see in particular Mercedes García-Arenal, Ahmad 
al-Mansur: The Beginnings of Modern Morocco (London: One World, 2009); and Stephen Cory, 
Reviving the Islamic Caliphate in Early Modern Morocco (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).
13  P. G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900 (London: Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, [1977(?)]), pp. 22–24.
14  ‘Lettre de George Thomas à Robert Cecil’, 30 October 1603, and ‘Requête de Thomas 
Pate à Jacques Ier’, [late 1603], in Les Sources inédites de l’histoire du Maroc. Prémiere série — 
Dynastie saadienne: Archives et bibliothèques d’Angleterre, ed. by Henry de Castries, Pierre de 
Cenival, and Philippe de Cossé Brissac, 3 vols (Paris: Ernest Leroux/Paul Geuthner, 1918–35), ii 
(1925), pp. 229–35, 236–39. Hereafter, this series has been abbreviated to SIHMA.
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of existing trading privileges given by his predecessors. With this concession 
Harrison returned to London in April 1611.15
Immediately upon his arrival in Morocco, Harrison had made note of a report 
of ‘pyrats’ operating out of Mehdya, also on the Atlantic coast. The concern at 
the time was not the effect of their activity on English vessels, rather the fact 
that the pirates were selling captured goods at discounted prices, undercutting 
European merchants.16 But it was the issue of the capture and enslavement of 
Englishmen by the ‘Sallee Rovers’ that was the reason for Harrison’s next mission 
to Zaydān. He was again dispatched with letters from the king, and finally arrived 
in Zaydān’s camp in November 1614. Harrison was granted an audience with 
the sultan, who agreed to free any English captives held in his dominions.17 A 
possible Anglo-Dutch alliance against Spain may have also been discussed, and 
this could explain why Harrison was accompanied by the sultan’s agent in the 
Netherlands, the Moroccan Jew Samuel Pallache.18 Zaydān provided Harrison 
with a letter to James in which he reaffirmed his friendship with England, and 
Harrison was also requested to personally deliver a letter to the States-General of 
the United Provinces. He returned to Morocco around June the following year to 
deliver the responses.19 Harrison was again sent to Morocco by the king in early 
1616 to arrange the release of his subjects, as previously agreed, but had still 
not received a response from the sultan when he departed almost sixteen months 
later without seemingly having even disembarked. It is unclear whether Zaydān’s 
failure to receive Harrison or establish any contact with him at this time was an 
unintentional snub, or, in fact, a sign of a more significant change in Zaydān’s 
disposition toward England, as asserted later by Harrison.20
Whatever the reason, the incident led to a hiatus in formal diplomatic 
relations which lasted for some seven years, and only ended when an English 
monarch once again sought the assistance of a Moroccan ruler against Spain, as 
15  ‘Lettre de John Harrison à Salisbury’, 10 June 1610, and ‘Lettre de John Harrison à 
Salisbury’, 14 October 1610, in SIHMA, ii, 449–50, 452–54; Rogers, History of Anglo-Moroccan 
Relations, p. 24.
16  ‘Lettre de John Harrison à Salisbury’, 10 June 1610, in SIHMA, ii, 450.
17  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, [end of 1627], in SIHMA, iii (1936), p. 67; Rogers, 
History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations, pp. 24–25.
18  Matar, ʻHarrison, John’. Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard Wiegers identify several 
interactions between Harrison and Pallache which occurred between 1610 and 1614 in A Man of 
Three Worlds: Samuel Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe, trans. by M. 
Beagles (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 75, 85, 86, 88, 91. On attempts 
by Moriscos, with the aid of Pallache, to engineer an alliance with European powers against 
Spain, see Mercedes García-Arenal, ʻThe Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration 
to the Hornacheros of Salé’, in The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain:A Mediterranean 
Diaspora, ed. by Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard M. Weigers (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 286–
328 (pp. 312–13).
19  SIHMA, iii, 67–68; Rogers, History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations, p. 25.
20  ‘Lettre de Francis Cottington à John Coke’, 31 March 1618, and ‘Lettre de John 
Harrison à Moulay Zidân’, Tétouan, [c. July 1625], in SIHMA, ii, 509, 571; ‘Relation de John 
Harrison’, [end 1627], in SIHMA, iii, 68–69.
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Elizabeth had, and to appease the concerns of his subjects about their kin held 
captive in Morocco.21 Nevertheless, the archival records for this period of official 
diplomatic quiescence reveal the strength of the underlying interest that Britons 
still had with Morocco: trade and commerce continued unabated, merchants and 
officials maintained a close eye on political developments and other happenings, 
negotiations on the release of captives were undertaken, and attempts were made 
to nurture relations with local rulers within a splintered polity.22
II. Seeking Allies and Converts, 1625–27
In 1625 James I died and was succeeded by his son, Charles I. James had never 
embraced relations with Morocco beyond the necessity for prosaic diplomacy 
concerning the release of captives or the commercial interests of his subjects. 
The factors which had helped drive and define what came to be seen as a golden 
age of Anglo-Moroccan diplomatic relations during the latter part of the sixteenth 
century were no longer extant. Aside from the death of the architects of the 
entente, the threat to England from Spain had diminished with the signing of the 
Peace of London in 1604. Furthermore, with al-Mansūr’s passing, Morocco had 
descended into political and social anarchy, making it difficult for merchants and 
officials alike to negotiate an everchanging landscape of sovereignty across the 
country, as well as disrupting traditional trading patterns. But, conversely, the 
unrest encouraged illicit trade by English merchants with the warring parties, 
particularly in weapons, which became a new source of diplomatic tension.
Preparations for the resumption of hostilities with Spain in 1625 motivated 
the new English king to attempt a rapprochement with his country’s past ally, 
and he dispatched his father’s former envoy, John Harrison. In a personal letter 
to Zaydān, Charles reminded the sultan of the ‘greate amyty and corespondacy’ 
which had existed between Elizabeth and al-Mansūr, and expressed his desire 
that it ‘continewe for the good of the subjects of both our dominions, and other 
reasons he [Harrison] can more at large informe yow’.23 Harrison subsequently 
arrived in Tétouan on Morocco’s Mediterranean coast in June that same year on 
his fifth mission. But before examining the events of this mission it is necessary 
to understand more about the nature of the man who had been charged with this 
important task.
While they were undoubtedly important to him, Harrison’s interests in North 
Africa were clearly more than just a desire to serve his country by fulfilling his 
commission, and to achieve personal financial gain and improve his status. His 
writings reveal him to be a deeply religious man, staunchly anti-Catholic, and 
21  ‘Lettre de Charles Ier à Moulay Zidân’, [27 March–1 June 1625], and ‘Lettre de John 
Harrison à Moulay Zidân’, Tétouan, [13 June–30 July 1625], in SIHMA, ii, 565–66, 571–72.
22  See, for example, the correspondence dealing with these issues in SIHMA, ii, 510–64, 
passim.
23  ‘Lettre de Charles Ier à Moulay Zidân’, [27 March–1 June 1625], in SIHMA, ii, 566.
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possessed of ‘a deep evangelical zeal’.24 The way in which the interarticulation 
of these elements of Harrison’s character and motivations helped shaped his 
thinking about Morocco is well demonstrated in a pamphlet he published in 1613, 
The New Prophetical King of Barbary. The pamphlet is purported to reproduce 
correspondence from an English merchant residing in Morocco concerning the 
latest political developments there. Harrison’s correspondent, ‘R. S.’, recounts the 
success of a Sufi mystic or marabout, Abu Mahalli (c. 1560–1613),25 in a popular 
uprising against Mawlay Zaydān. The majority of the account is particularly 
noteworthy for R. S.’s support for, and admiration of, the rebel leader.26
R. S. records that Abu Mahalli announced that he came to make peace, 
having been sent by God to challenge the ruling dynasty, ‘to stablish their Prophets 
religion […] and recover those parts of Christendome the king of Spaine holds 
from them […] and tels his people they shall yet see great wonders come to 
passe’. One such wonder would be the appearance of a bridge across the Strait 
of Gibraltar by which his followers would invade Spain, Italy, and France, and 
having achieved this he would reign for forty years until the coming of Christ and 
the final judgement; but, he insisted, ‘for England, Flanders or other parts they 
have not to doe, they will have friendship with us’.27 R. S. recounts all this without 
any hint of alarm or scepticism. But the treatment of subsequent details of the 
marabout’s life and achievements becomes distinctly ambivalent.28 By the end of 
the account the tone changes once again, from ambivalence to outright hostility, 
with R. S. purporting to state:
For my owne part I am perswaded, they be delusions of the divell done 
by witchcraft, and permitted by the Lord, to seduce them to further error. 
God deliver us Christians well from among them, and grant us the use, 
and true knowledge of his holy word preached in Christian countries 
which here we want.29
During the course of the letter Abu Mahalli has been transformed from a 
saviour of the country, and a potential ally of Protestant nations, to an agent of the 
devil. The combined text is inherently contradictory—Abu Mahalli is both lauded 
24  Matar, ʻHarrison, John’.
25  The French term marabout, derived from the Arabic murabit, is commonly used to 
designate a Muslim mystic. However, in North Africa the word may also have an association 
with a holy man’s involvement in warfare. See Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam: An Introduction 
to Sufism (London: Tauris, 2012), p. 129. While Abu Mahalli is often referred to as a marabout, 
Baldick notes that he was, in fact, ‘a student of many different disciplines’. Abu Mahalli is a 
fascinating character and much has been written about him and the influential role played by 
marabouts in North African political history more generally, but both subjects are outside the 
scope of this article.
26  See, for example, R. S., The New Prophetical King of Barbary or the Last Newes from 
Thence in a Letter Written of Late from a Merchant There, to a Gentl. Not Long Since Imployed 
into that Countrie from His Maiestie, ed. by John Harrison (London, 1613), sigs B3v, B[4]v–Cr.
27  R. S., New Prophetical King, sig. B3r–v.
28  R. S., New Prophetical King, sigs Cr–C2v.
29  R. S., New Prophetical King, sig. C[3]r (my emphasis).
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and demonized—so much so that the exercise of editorial licence by Harrison 
appears to be the only plausible explanation.30 At the very least the account, as with 
others from this period, is marked by deep ambivalence, of conflicting perceptions 
concerning the Indigenous peoples, particularly their leaders.31
The pamphlet as a whole appears to be intended to serve as an apocalyptic 
and cautionary tale, warning of the dangers of false prophets (including the 
Pope),32 highlighting the risk of civil conflict arising from pride and self-interest,33 
and defending the doctrine of the divine right of kings, ‘whether Christian, or 
heathen’.34 But Harrison also teasingly remarks in the epilogue that the civil unrest 
‘may serve for another use: a finall use of all, either that hath passed, or may 
hereafter fall out’.35 It is a cryptic statement, but he appears to be implying that 
an opportunity may arise as a result of the disorder. It is possible that Harrison 
was conveying a millenarian expectation, but more likely he was alluding to the 
more immediate possibility of political and evangelical intervention in Morocco, 
proposals for which he would later develop and promote. However, the timing 
of the publication and its nature indicates that Harrison had a motivation beyond 
patriotic and religious service. In the previous year he had lost his patron, Prince 
Henry, and the pamphlet appears to have been a means by which he sought 
to promote himself as a man of true Protestant conviction, having significant 
knowledge of, and experience in, Morocco, and possessing a mysterious, yet 
beguiling, plan.
Harrison’s lack of gainful employment at the time again appears to have 
been a motivation behind his publication of another text which also appeared the 
same year, the treatise The Messiah Alreadie Come.36 It was dedicated to Maurice, 
Prince of Orange, from whom Harrison undoubtedly sought favour.37 But it is an 
30  Gary K. Waite compares and contrasts this account and two Dutch pamphlets which 
also deal with the conflict between Mawlay Zaydān and Abu Mahalli during this time. However, 
Waite overlooks the inherent dissonance in the English text. See Waite, ʻReimagining Religious 
Identity: The Moor in Dutch and English Pamphlets, 1550–1620’, Renaissance Quarterly, 66 
(2013), 1250–95 (pp. 1278–85). 
31  Kenneth Parker also makes this observation in ʻReading “Barbary” in Early Modern 
England, 1550–1685’, The Seventeenth Century, 19 (2004), 87–115 (p. 101).
32  R. S., New Prophetical King, sig. A[4]r-v.
33  ‘Non unquam tulit documenta, fors majora quam fragili loco starent superbi’ (‘Never 
did fortune give larger proofs on what shaky ground stand the proud’ (my translation)). See 
epilogue in R. S., New Prophetical King.
34  Preface in R. S., New Prophetical King.
35  Epilogue in R. S., New Prophetical King.
36  John Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come. Or Proofs of Christianitie, Both Out of 
the Scriptures, and Auncient Rabbins, to Convince the Jewes, of their Palpable, and More then 
Miserable Blindnes (if More May Be) for their Long, Vayne, and Endles Expectation of their 
Messiah (as They Dreame) Yet For to Come (Amsterdam, 1613). A second edition was printed in 
Amsterdam in 1619, and a third edition appeared in London in 1656, entitled A Vindication of the 
Holy Scriptures. Or the Manifestation of Jesus Christ. The True Messiah Already Come.
37  Refer to the last paragraph of the dedication. To ensure that was there no doubt 
about the reasons he was giving Maurice the honour, nor about his current circumstances, the 
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altogether different document to The New Prophetical King; written by Harrison 
while he was residing in Morocco in 1610, it provides insight into his attitudes 
to Moroccan society, and his theological beliefs. The treatise reveals Harrison 
as a millenarian Protestant whose convictions were also heavily influenced by a 
contemporary phenomenon in which a more positive interest in the Jewish people 
and their culture and history was promoted—a general disposition that has been 
termed philo-semitism, which developed in England from the early seventeenth 
century.38 It is a detailed polemic intended to convince Jews of the truth of 
Christianity, and encourage them to convert, not simply to save their souls, but, 
together with the destruction of the Catholic Church, as a precondition for the 
arrival of the Apocalypse and the Second Coming.39 The identification of Harrison 
as a millenarian is reinforced by his continued interest in the dispossessed elector 
of the Palatinate, Frederick V (1596–1632) and his wife, whose cause to regain the 
lands he lost soon after the commencement of the Thirty Years War became the 
focus of various portentous ideas among Protestants with chiliastic beliefs, such 
as Harrison.40
During his mission to Morocco in 1610 Harrison spent a period of almost 
six months in Safi on the Atlantic coast, during which time he was befriended 
by a local rabbi, and a further three and a half months living among the Jewish 
community in Marrakesh.41 While in The New Prophetical King Harrison does not 
express any views about Arab or Berber Moroccans, beyond criticizing them for 
their gullibility for having been deceived by ‘idle and superstitious vanities’,42 in 
his treatise he openly reveals his feelings and perceptions about Moroccan Jews. 
He notes that while in Safi, the rabbi helped better acquaint him with Hebrew, and 
Harrison found him to be ‘of grave, and sober cariage, and pleasant otherwise’, 
and was glad to have his company during what he describes as ‘that tedious 
dedication was also translated into Dutch while the remainder of the document is only rendered 
in English.
38  Ronald H. Fritze, ʻJews in England’, in Historical Dictionary of Stuart England, 1603–
1689, ed. by Ronald H. Fritze and William B. Robison (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 
pp. 269–70. For a more detailed account of the development of philo-semitism in England, see 
David S. Katz, Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603–1655 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982).
39  Harrison acknowledges that much of the content is not original, but ‘borrowed’ from 
another text, ‘The Christian Directorie or Resolution’, by which he undoubtedly means Robert 
Persons’s The Christian Directorie, Guiding Men to their Salvation, originally entitled The First 
Booke of the Christian Exercise, Appertayning to Resolution, published in 1582. See Harrison, 
The Messiah Alreadie Come, sig. A2v. On the importance of the Jews to English millenarian 
thought, see Katz, Philo-Semitism, ch. 3.
40  John Reeve, ʻSir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen 
of Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War’, Parergon, 32.3 (2015), 
151–81 (p. 166). Frederick acquired the sobriquet ‘the Winter King’ among his detractors as a 
result of his brief reign as King of Bohemia between 1619 and 1620.
41  Harrison, Messiah Alreadie Come, pp. 61–62.
42  R. S., New Prophetical King, sig. A[4]r.
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time’.43 In Marrakesh he ‘grewe familiarly acquainted’ with various members of 
the local Jewish community, attending wedding ceremonies and ‘solemne feasts’, 
and was introduced to their ‘dainties’ (food) which he ‘tooke very kindly, and ever 
since have studied’.44 It is unclear whether his experiences in Morocco in 1610 
encouraged Harrison to embrace philo-semitism or he had already done so, but 
they undoubtedly contributed to his convictions. His account of that time shows 
him to be a person who was genuinely interested in Jewish culture, and who 
possessed a level of concern about the situation of Jews, particularly that of ‘the 
forlorne, and distressed Jewes in Barbarie’,45 that went beyond the requirements of 
pure eschatological belief. All these beliefs and attitudes which are reflected in his 
earlier writing conditioned to some extent or other Harrison’s subsequent thinking 
concerning Morocco and its people.
The exact purposes for which Harrison had been sent to treat with the sultan 
in 1625 are not clearly stated in the letters provided to him by Charles I and 
Harrison. Charles’s earlier letter indicates that captives remained a source of 
grievance, and Harrison confirms that he had been charged to negotiate their 
release.46 But the king also referred to ‘other reasons’ that would be expounded on 
by Harrison. While Harrison did not elaborate in detail, it is evident that Charles 
was seeking assistance from Zaydān in his war with Spain. In a letter to Zaydān 
written shortly after his arrival, Harrison reminds the sultan that he had requested 
Harrison to advise him ‘if there were any lykelyhood of wars’ and, if so, he would 
give assistance to the English. He goes on to insist that ‘now is the tyme or neaver’ 
for both parties ‘to right themselves against theire enimies’.47
However, in a later report to Charles, Harrison reveals that the mission had 
been initiated, at Harrison’s suggestion, to ‘sound the affectiones and dispositions 
of that people [Moroccans], and especiallie the Moriscoes or Andaluzes banished 
out of Spaine’ who, as a result of their hatred for the Spanish and knowledge of 
that country, may be useful in many ways, including in the provision of supplies 
and other necessities for the English navy.48 But it is unclear that when Harrison 
embarked on the mission he possessed a defined plan for how Morocco could be 
engaged in prosecution of the war.49 A plan would emerge, shaped by Harrison’s 
subsequent experiences in the country, and detailed in a proposal that he sent to the 
commander of an English fleet which he had been advised would visit Morocco 
shortly after his arrival.
43  Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come, p. 61.
44  Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come, p. 62.
45  Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come, p. 61.
46  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant de la flotte britannique’, 20 July 1625, in 
SIHMA, ii, 575.
47  ‘Lettre de John Harrison à Moulay Zidân’, [13 June–30 July 1625], in SIHMA, ii, 572.
48  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 30.
49  Cf. Matar, ʻHarrison, John’.
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Harrison had intended to travel first to Salé, ‘there to have understood the 
state of the countrie’, and then to meet with the sultan.50 But he was convinced 
by the muqaddams (leaders) of Tétouan that due to the conflict within the country 
it was far too dangerous to do so by land, and was otherwise dissuaded by them 
from meeting with Zaydān. His hosts proceeded to impugn Zaydān’s character and 
power before revealing that they no longer paid allegiance to him, and set about 
attempting to take advantage of the good fortune of having the English king’s 
representative in their midst.51 According to Harrison, they offered him, ‘freelie, 
and of their owne accord’, in excess of ten thousand men to assist the English to 
take the Spanish enclave at Ceuta, ‘or any other place near’. All that they requested 
in return was a supply of gunpowder and the repair of some ordnance.52
Harrison was very much enamoured by this proposal and was clearly 
convinced that there was not only widespread popular support for war with Spain, 
but also a ‘generall disposicion and inclination both towards our nation, and even 
to Christian religion’.53 He was not necessarily misguided in these conclusions. As 
Mercedes García-Arenal points out, the Moriscos not only considered the English 
and Dutch as potential allies in their long-held plans to reconquer their former 
lands in Spain, but also found the form of Christianity which they professed easier 
to identify with than Catholicism.54 Inspired by his positive reception and ‘to 
blow the fire already kindled’,55 Harrison drafted two public letters to express 
England’s amity with ‘Moores, Turkes, Jewes and others’, and highlight their 
common cause against the Catholic powers.56  The events in Tétouan also gave him 
reason to reflect on his mission and consider new possibilities. In his report to the 
commander of the English fleet, Harrison outlines an ambitious plan. He explains 
that with the help of the people of Tétouan, Ceuta could be taken and become an 
entrepôt for English trade. Jews and Moriscos, most of whome were ‘alreadie 
Christian in heart’, and even Moors, would flock to the enclave, providing it 
with both men and other supplies. He further suggested dispossessing Spain of 
Gibraltar and ‘Mamora’ (Mehdya) to provide England with not only control of 
50  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 580.
51  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 575–76, 581. 
52  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 576. In this account Harrison 
implies that the offer of the ten thousand men was the initiative of the muqaddams, but in a 
much later account he indicates that this had been his aim from the beginning. See ‘Mémoire 
de John Harrison’, 15 July 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 145. It is quite possible that Harrison wished his 
compatriots to believe it was a spontaneous proposition to evidence local support for it. 
53  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 578. 
54  García-Arenal, ʻThe Moriscos in Morocco’, p. 314. In fact, García-Arenal also notes 
that following their arrival in Morocco, many Moriscos proclaimed to be Catholics and were 
treated as apostates. See ʻThe Moriscos in Morocco’, pp. 317–18.
55  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 578.
56  ‘Lettre de John Harrison aux Maures’, 27 June 1625, in SIHMA, ii, 567–68.
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the Strait, but also a base from which to attack Spanish shipping and to disrupt 
supplies to Spain’s other possessions in Morocco.57
At least partly, what Harrison proposed was a strategy to help prosecute the 
war with Spain. But like an earlier envoy, the commercial agent Henry Roberts 
who had represented Elizabeth I in al-Mansūr’s court over two decades earlier, 
Harrison was also offering a means to further England’s religious, political, and 
commercial interests in Morocco itself. However, unlike Roberts, Harrison was 
not recommending that this be achieved through the conquest of the country, but 
rather by nurturing the continuation of political instability, and the development 
of relationships with all parties which were advantageous to England’s interests.58 
While Roberts had been seemingly motivated by impecuniousness and a desire 
to curry the king’s favour, Harrison was inspired by evangelical zeal and a belief 
that Moriscos and Jews were crypto-Christians awaiting release from Muslim 
thraldom. Harrison’s religious myopia even allowed him to envisage a general 
flight of people from tyranny in Spain, Portugal, and Morocco following the 
execution of his plan.59 
In this respect the report appears to indicate a significant change in his 
attitude toward Zaydān, and perhaps Morocco’s traditional political leadership 
more generally, in response to what he had observed or been told, which may 
have helped inform his plan. Whereas Harrison had previously defended Zaydān 
as the divinely appointed ruler of Morocco, his report reflects disillusionment 
with the sultan. Concerned with what he had heard about the sultan’s usage of 
his people and Christian captives, and his complicity in corsairing, ‘even to the 
English Channell’,60 Harrison began to question Zaydān’s legitimacy, allowing 
him to conceive of usurping his authority in the interests of England’s Protestant 
cause. It was a bold but naive plan, and, as with such proposals in the past, it 
came to nothing, as was also the case when Harrison presented a similar proposal 
to Charles I some two years later.61 These proposals were no more than fantasies 
based on an overestimation of English military power, and either a flawed 
understanding of Moroccan motivations and aspirations, or an overriding desire to 
believe otherwise. Yet while they may not represent a milestone in the evolution 
of English colonial adventurism, they certainly indicate a marked development in 
Harrison’s thinking.
Harrison left Tétouan and travelled to Salé in early 1626 where he met with 
Muhammad al-‛Ayāshī, the charismatic leader of a local Arab tribe and marabout 
who had commenced a jihad against the Spanish and subsequently rebelled against 
57  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 579–80.
58  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 580. On Roberts, see 
‘Mémoire de Henry Roberts à Jacques Ier’, [3 April 1603], in SIHMA, ii, 222–28.
59  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, 581. Cf. Matar, Britain and 
Barbary, pp. 42–43.
60  ‘Lettre de John Harrison au commandant’, in SIHMA, ii, p. 580.
61  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 53–54, 56. See also 
Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 43.
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the Sa‛dīs. Al-‛Ayāshī was keen to foster relations with England, particularly to 
obtain assistance to take Mehdya from the Spanish. Harrison also concluded an 
agreement with the Moriscos to provide them with armaments and ammunition 
in exchange for the release of captives, before embarking for England in May of 
that year.62 
III. Picking Sides, Questions of Legitimacy, and Friendships, 1627–30
It was not long before Harrison returned, arriving in January 1627 with instructions 
to treat with the ‘King, Princes, Governors and Commanders of the parts of 
Barbary’ for both the redemption of captives and to establish relations for ‘our 
common utillety and safety’.63 Charles does not appear to have been concerned at 
the time with whom Harrison treated, so it is unsurprising that he first contacted the 
Moriscos of Salé with whom he had developed a close relationship. It was around 
this time that the Salétins withdrew their allegiance from the Sa‛dīs and formally 
announced their independence. Notwithstanding this act of rebellion, Harrison 
negotiated an agreement with the town’s leaders which guaranteed freedom of 
trade with Salé and protection of English vessels, and provided for the release of 
Britons held captive there.64 Despite receiving an order from Zaydān soon after the 
agent’s arrival that Harrison be sent to him, the Salétins refused to release him, and 
Harrison made no effort to meet with the sultan before embarking for England in 
late May 1627.65 
As well as returning with almost two hundred emancipated Britons, Harrison 
also brought with him a draft treaty which may have been of great benefit to 
England. However, Charles declined to endorse the treaty on the advice of the Court 
of Admiralty. In the court’s view, the Moriscos were not suitable treaty partners 
as they were considered to be both pirates and rebels.66 Without their maritime 
activities being sanctioned by a recognized sovereign power, the Moriscos of Salé 
could not even claim the questionably superior status of corsairs.67 Nevertheless, 
not wishing to antagonize the Salétins, the king, in a carefully worded letter, did 
62  ‘Lettre de Sidi Mohammed el-‛Ayyachi a Charles Ier’, 7 May 1627, and ‘Relation de 
John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 23, 32–34.
63  ‘Lettre de commission pour John Harrison’, 5 December 1626, in SIHMA, iii, 12.
64  ‘Projet de traité entre Salé [Rabat] et l’Angleterre’, 30 April 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 
16–20.
65  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 39–40, 48.
66  Rogers, History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations, p. 27; Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, 
Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 169. The House of Lords had earlier agreed that a treaty 
was the best means to achieve the release of the captives and that the king be advised to this 
affect, but members had assumed that any treaty would be with the sultan. See ʻHouse of Lords 
Journal Volume 3: 19 April 1626’, in Journal of the House of Lords, 64 vols (London, 1767–
1830), iii: 1620–1628, p. 564, British History Online <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/
vol3/pp562-565> [accessed 15 July 2016].
67  On the legal status of corsairs and prize law in the Mediterranean in the early modern 
period, see Stein, ʻThe Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade’, pp. 208–211.
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express his gratitude for the release of his subjects and for the promise of freedom 
of trade, and assured them that they would receive similarly favourable treatment 
from the English.68 While Charles did not intend to formally acknowledge the 
treaty, he clearly desired the terms which had been negotiated; it was to be a treaty 
in all respects but in name. 
Harrison subsequently prepared a report for the king on his last two 
missions. But it is more than a simple account of events and observations; he 
uses it to undermine the legitimacy of Zaydān’s rule and argues fervently in 
support of alliances with the Moriscos of Tétouan and Salé, and with Muhammad 
al-‛Ayāshī. In doing so, the report also reveals more about Harrison’s personal 
beliefs, and what effect his experiences in Morocco may have had on them. His 
disdain for Zaydān is obvious throughout the account. In Harrison’s view, the 
sultan is not only a cruel tyrant, but the ‘originall of all these evils’ committed 
against Christians at Salé;69 the instigator of the enslavement of the king’s 
subjects;70 and treacherous.71 Furthermore, he insinuates that Zaydān’s hold on 
power is tenuous,72 he is regarded with suspicion by even his own men, and is in 
league with Spain.73 In contrast, he asserts al-‛Ayāshī was an enemy of Spain, and 
a friend of England, whose followers hold the king in ‘great honour and love’.74 
The Moriscos also hold the king in high regard, are grateful for the assistance he 
has provided to them, and offer their services to him.75 According to Harrison, 
the Moriscos possessed ‘a verie great affection and inclination to our nation’, 
as do many Arabs and Berbers.76 He argues that this sentiment must be patiently 
nurtured.77 He also questions whether they, in fact, should be regarded as rebels. 
If England was prepared to treat with Algiers, why should it not also do so with 
the Moriscos? And in any event, to whom should they be loyal when they were 
born Christians in Spain, banished and delivered ‘into the hands of infidels’, and 
now after establishing a ‘Christian government’ they profess their love for Charles 
and seek his protection.78 Overlooking the obvious difference in religion, Harrison 
questions whether in this respect they are any different to the Dutch Republic, 
which England was supporting.79
68  ‘Lettres de Charles Ier’, 12 October 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 58–59.
69  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 42.
70  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 33, 51.
71  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 39–40. On Harrison’s 
views regarding Zaydān and his rule, see also ‘Relation de John Harrison’, [end 1627], in 
SIHMA, iii, 65–67.
72  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 32, 36–37, 53.
73  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 37.
74  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 44.
75  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 30–32, 38, 40–42.
76  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 42.
77  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 42–43.
78  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 51–52 (p. 51). 
79  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 53.
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Harrison was attempting to convince the king to support the Moriscos in what 
he believed to be the furtherance of England’s religious and secular interests, but 
in doing so he reveals genuine empathy for them. In particular, he laments their 
forced exodus from Spain, drawing parallels with those other people of Morocco 
with whom he also had affinity, the Jews:
Never the like desolation of people since that and of the Jewish nation 
[…] yea, more than lamentable […] banished and betrayed, not only 
their bodies but their soules as a praie of the Devill into the hands of the 
Turkes and Moores, men, women and children […] as a forlorne people 
scattered and dispersed like the Jewes to this daie.80
Harrison did not express any notable general prejudice against either Moroccan 
Arabs or Berbers, but it was the Moriscos, with their knowledge of Christianity 
and Europeanized culture, whom Harrison held in greatest favour, along with their 
similarly persecuted compatriots, the Jews.
The religion with which the majority of the people for whom he was eliciting 
support were affiliated warranted little critical attention from Harrison. His only 
explicit comments depict Islam as an oppressive system of idolatrous belief 
opposed to Christianity.81 Nevertheless, he comments favourably on marabouts,82 
despite his apparent earlier editorial excoriation of Abu Mahalli, and, in particular, 
thought highly of al-‛Ayāshī, even though he was a committed mujahid. Harrison’s 
relationship with al-‛Ayāshī is interesting; he obviously believed him to be a friend 
of England and useful for that reason, and, as with his relationship with the people 
of Tétouan and Salé, he went no further to question his motives. Instead Harrison 
seemed less concerned with understanding their religion than with finding signs 
that confirmed to him that the people of Morocco were potential allies, and, 
critically, ultimately religiously redeemable.
However, Harrison was eventually forced to acknowledge that the issue 
of religious difference did present a major impediment for any cooperative 
endeavours against the Spanish. Asked by al-‛Ayāshī to help enlist the support 
of a Dutch fleet for an attack against Mehdya, Harrison, in consultation with the 
Dutch admiral, had to concoct an excuse against its involvement. Despite the 
Spanish being ‘of a contrarie profession and enimies’, he did not believe it to 
be honourable ‘to betraie them into the hands of infidels to be made slaves’.83 
He even anguished over wishing al-‛Ayāshī ‘good successe’ with his venture.84 
Harrison clearly possessed a sense of fundamental Christian unity which overrode 
his anti-Catholicism. But this perhaps was not his only reservation. He also 
80  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 41. García-Arenal, ʻThe 
Moriscos in Morocco’, p. 314, also remarks on the obvious sympathy which Harrison felt for the 
Moriscos.
81  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 42, 52.
82  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 32, 44, 46.
83  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 44–45.
84  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 45.
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demonstrates a general abhorrence of slavery irrespective of the nature of the 
victims. Misquoting Exodus 21, he states: ‘Condemned by the law of God […] 
manstealers and mansellers both alike, were they never so great enemies either to 
nation or religion; they [those enslaved] are the image of God by creation as the 
first, and so to be respected’.85 While Harrison’s attitudes and actions were clearly 
informed by religious conviction, they also appear to have been influenced by 
humanistic belief.
Harrison was clearly frustrated that his warnings about Zaydān and plans 
for fostering closer relations with Tétouan and Salé were falling on deaf ears at 
home. Toward the end of 1627 he wrote again to the king expressing criticism of 
the sultan. He questions Zaydān’s integrity, and contrasts his behaviour with that 
of the Moriscos, and the outcomes which have been achieved by treating with 
them. Harrison even goes so far as advocating that a naval squadron be sent to the 
sultan’s stronghold at Safi to coerce him to release captive Britons and to correct 
other alleged wrongs. Once again, Harrison asserts his belief in the imminent 
conversion of the Moriscos and emphasizes the strategic value of their ports for 
the supply of English vessels, particularly now that England was at war not only 
with Spain, but also with France.86 
Notwithstanding Harrison’s unwavering positive assessment of the Moriscos’ 
disposition toward England, attacks on English vessels and captive taking by 
their corsairs continued to escalate. But the Moroccans in turn alleged that their 
ships were being preyed upon by English merchants and privateers, despite a 
proclamation by Charles prohibiting attacks on vessels from Algiers, Tunis, 
Tétouan, and Salé.87 In response, Harrison was again sent to Morocco to negotiate 
the release of captives and to re-establish peaceful relations.88 After a long delay 
due to impecuniousness resulting from his service to the king, Harrison arrived in 
Morocco in March 1630. He claims to have successfully allayed the concerns of 
the Salétins, confirmed their commitment to peace, and negotiated proposals for 
the improvement of trade. Harrison proposed to the king that he return with ‘a 
mynister or twoo’ to attend to the local merchants and proselytize among ‘bothe 
Moores and Jewes, whose conversion we daylie expecte’. Before departing for 
England in late August he dispatched a letter to the new Sa‛dī sultan, Abd al-Malik 
II (r. 1627–31), who had assumed the throne following the death of his father, 
Mawlay Zaydān, but made no effort to meet with him, concerned with how he 
would be received, and regarding al-Malik even less favourably than his father.89
85  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in SIHMA, iii, 36.
86  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, [end 1627], in SIHMA, iii, 63–72.
87  ‘Proclamation de Charles Ier’, 22 October 1628, in SIHMA, iii, 80–81. On these 
developments, see Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, pp. 169–70.
88  ‘Lettres de commission pour John Harrison’, 21 January 1629, and ‘Relation de John 
Harrison’, 28 September 1630, in SIHMA, iii, 82–84, 111.
89  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 28 September 1630, in SIHMA, iii, 111–12, 115–16.
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Harrison had not given up on his plans for expanding England’s interests 
in the region, appending to his report a revised and more detailed proposal for 
the taking of Mehdya.90 In his view the action was justified because the place 
was held by the Spanish, who were ‘enemies of both our nation and religion’.91 
Furthermore, it would provide a good harbour for the resupply of vessels, a base 
from which to suppress the activities of both the Spanish and Muslim corsairs, 
and a trading centre for the whole area. Harrison envisaged a fortified plantation 
fully maintained by customs duties. He assured King Charles that the Moroccans 
‘earnestlie desire it’, and that Jews and Moors would come seeking the king’s 
protection from their own rulers and the civil unrest they had created.92 There was 
no risk, he states, that the Moroccans would retake it, ‘for they desire it not to be in 
their owne hands’, yet he still advised that, just to be sure, fifty percent of customs 
duties should be paid to Muhammad al-‛Ayāshī.93 
Though that was not the limit of Harrison’s vision. He suggested that the 
Salétins might also wish to join with the proposed English enclave, and enticed 
the king with a sign of their imminent conversion and a report of a supposedly 
secret silver mine nearby.94 Perhaps inspired by a French attempt to colonize 
‘Mogodore’ (Essaouira) the previous year, he went on to propose that given the 
contempt which the sultan had shown towards the king and his subjects, an island 
off the coast of that city be taken from him, and another plantation established 
there on the same terms with the local leaders. From these two sites, Harrison 
conjectured, the English could monopolize trade across the country, and obtain 
the supplies necessary to attempt to take from Spain ‘the Maderars’ (Madeira), or 
possibly Gibraltar and Ceuta.95 These plans and expectations of popular support 
were not simply the products of Harrison’s own devising: they had been actively 
nurtured by the leaders of Tétouan and Salé, al-‛Ayāshī, and even ‘Captain John’, 
the notorious Dutch pirate and later renegade corsair Jan Janszoon van Haarlem, 
perhaps better known as Murat Reis ‘the Younger’, the former president and 
grand admiral of the republic of Salé,96 with whom Harrison had developed a 
close relationship; and they continued to press him for a response from the king. 
Harrison concludes by suggesting that if Charles does not wish to take advantage 
of these opportunities, that he commission his brother-in-law, Frederick V, to work 
with the Dutch to do so. For Harrison, it was not solely an English cause, but 
90  ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora’, [28 September 1630], in SIHMA, iii, 
124–31.
91  ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora’, in SIHMA, iii, 125.
92  ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora’, in SIHMA, iii, 125–26.
93  ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora’, in SIHMA, iii, 128.
94  ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora’, in SIHMA, iii, 127–28.
95  ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 28 September 1630, and ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur 
la Mamora’, in SIHMA, iii, 117–18, 130.
96  Among van Haarlem’s exploits was the so called ‘Sack of Baltimore’ in June 1631, in 
which he captured 109 English inhabitants of the town of Baltimore, on the coast of County Cork 
in Ireland, and sold them into slavery in Algiers.
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more generally a Protestant one, and one he felt compelled to pursue one way or 
another. Whether the king provided a response to Harrison is unknown, but in any 
event the plan quickly became redundant with the signing of a treaty the following 
month which ended the war with Spain.
IV. Frustration and Despair, 1631–33
Harrison returned to Morocco in September 1631 with instructions to meet with 
al-Malik’s successor, his brother Mawlay al-Walid (r. 1631–36), and negotiate 
the release of captives.97 He had also intended to visit Salé to reassure the town’s 
people that action was being taken to address their grievances, but by this time the 
Salétins had lost faith with the English because of ongoing breaches of the peace, 
and became openly hostile toward them.98 Harrison was extremely disheartened 
by the situation. He was critical not only of the actions of his compatriots, but 
also the failure of the English government to act on his advice. He was concerned 
about the prospects for escalation of corsair activity, and, ultimately, the impact 
on the reputation of his nation and religion, and England’s interests in Morocco.99 
His concerns appear to have been heightened by both the concurrent efforts by 
the French to establish diplomatic relations with al-Walid, and the start of a new 
entente between the Salétins and the Sa‛dis which he seems to have believed also 
threatened English trade and influence.100 Too ‘afraid and ashamed to go ashoare’ 
at Salé, Harrison proceeded to Marrakesh to meet with the new sultan.101
He already held high expectations for al-Walid,102 and the sultan indeed proved 
more receptive that his father and brother had been to normalizing relations with 
England and resolving the perennial issue of the release of captives. By February 
1632 the two men had negotiated a draft treaty.103 The document principally 
concerns the rights of the English in the conduct of business in Morocco, and the 
obligations of the sultan and his subjects in this respect, although, interestingly, it 
does provide Moroccans with the right to both buy and sell goods in England.104 
It is notable for the recourse in its construction to the ‘favours and priviledges 
auntiently belonging to the English nation’,105 with specific references made to 
those existing under the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr, during the perceived golden 
97  ‘Lettre de Charles Ier à Moulay El-Oualid’, 19 July 1631, and ‘Lettres de John Harrison 
à A. Carnwath’, 29 September 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 152, 161.
98  ‘Lettre de John Harrison à John Coke’, 3 August 1631, and ‘Lettres de John Harrison à 
A. Carnwarth’, 29 September 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 154, 160–62.
99  ‘Lettre de John Harrison à John Coke’, 3 August 1631, and ‘Lettres de John Harrison à 
A. Carnwarth’, 5 October 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 155, 164–66.
100  ‘Lettres de John Harrison à A. Carnwarth’, 5 October 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 163.
101  ‘Lettres de John Harrison à A. Carnwarth’, 5 October 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 165–66.
102  ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur le Maroc’, 15 July 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 150.
103  ‘Projet de traité entre Moulay El-Oualid et Charles Ier’, [6 November 1631–February 
1632], in SIHMA, iii, 174–78.
104  See Article 11.
105  ‘Projet de traité entre Moulay El-Oualid et Charles Ier’, in SIHMA, iii, 178.
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age of Anglo-Moroccan relations which was frequently evoked by parties on both 
sides during this period. While the treaty focused on English interests, it was 
conditional on acceptance of the sultan’s own demands. As al-Walid explained in 
a letter to Charles, his subjects had been taken captive because English merchants 
had been trading in contraband arms with his enemies, and if the king wished to 
restore traditional relations he must put a stop to this trade.106 Harrison returned 
to England in May 1632 and presented the draft agreement to Charles, but the 
king, for reasons which were not revealed, failed to endorse it, and did not call on 
Harrison ever again.
Clearly unhappy with the outcome, in 1633 Harrison published an account of 
the reign of al-Malik II in which he detailed his ‘cruel acts, and mad-pranks’, none 
of which he had in fact witnessed himself, instead relying on the testimony of 
‘such both of our owne nation and others’.107 Harrison claims to have written it as a 
present for Frederick V’s son and the nephew of Charles I, Charles Louis, the new 
Elector Palatine, and to assist him ‘discerne betixt a blessed Christian government 
[…] and a cruel-tyrannous Mahometan government’.108 But this detail appears 
to simply have provided the context for its true purpose, which is revealed in a 
proposition and petition appended to the account. Expressing guilt and remorse 
for not having completed his mission of freeing the remaining Britons in Morocco, 
Harrison calls on Protestant rulers to unite and act to redeem all Christians held in 
North Africa, ‘all those poore soules that are in miserie, both under the Turks and 
Moores’.109
Harrison’s utility as a diplomatic agent had perhaps come to an end due to 
the convergence of several factors which had less to do with his capabilities as 
an envoy than with his beliefs. Under James I there had been a move away from 
the more radically inclined, Calvinist predestinarianism ascribed to by Harrison. 
Furthermore, by the 1630s Spain was no longer seen as England’s implacable 
enemy. In the interests of trade and the Exchequer, Charles I adopted a position 
of pro-Spanish neutrality; as a result, support for Protestant internationalism, of 
which opposition to Spain was a central component, was no longer a minority 
view, but also a potentially treasonable one.110 Moreover, while interest in philo-
semitism and millenarianism would continue to grow in England until the middle 
of the century, the promotion of Jews as being central to Christian eschatology 
remained a contentious issue.111 Therefore, Harrison’s confessional and millenarian 
106  ‘Lettre de Moulay el-Oualid à Charles Ier’, 21 December 1631, in SIHMA, iii, 170–73.
107  John Harrison, The Tragicall Life and Death of Muley Abdala Melek the Late King of 
Barbarie. With a Proposition, or Petition to all Christian Princes, Annexed thereunto: Written 
by a Gentleman Imployed into those Parts (Delph, 1633), p. 1. An extract from the pamphlet is 
provided in SIHMA, iii, 191–206.
108  Dedication in Harrison, Tragicall Life and Death, sig. A2r.
109  Harrison, Tragicall Life and Death, sigs A2v–A3r (dedication), pp. 20–24 (p. 22). 
110  Reeve, ʻSir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe’, pp. 164, 175.
111  Katz, Philo-Semitism, pp. 1, 5, 95, 97. The decline in millenarianism and other 
mystical beliefs after this time can be seen as a sign of the subsidence of common anxiety which 
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beliefs were, if not yet outmoded, potentially problematic, as too, possibly, were 
his increasingly strident views about the legitimacy of Morocco’s professed rulers. 
Rather than customary authority, Harrison instead had invoked considerations 
of moral authority, popular sentiment, and territorial control to either support or 
challenge their dynastic legitimacy. It was an issue that would continue to vex 
the English in prosecuting their activities in Morocco over the following decades. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, it was also an issue that was beginning to assume great 
significance within England itself from around the same time as Parliament began 
to challenge the authority of the Stuarts, and as the country commenced its own 
descent into civil war.112  
V. Conclusion
While the geopolitical contexts in which Harrison’s missions to Morocco were 
undertaken are certainly important in understanding his thinking and actions, 
he in no way can be viewed simply as a servile mouthpiece for English foreign 
policy; his personal agency is clearly evident. Furthermore, while his encounters 
with the country may not have been epiphanic, leading to wholesale change in his 
underlying world view, Harrison’s accounts and other writings demonstrate that his 
feelings, thoughts, and behaviour which they convey can only be fully understood 
with reference to the interplay between his existing religious persuasions and 
other personal beliefs, and the impact of his experiences in Morocco. This is 
certainly the case in relation to his views about dynastic legitimacy. The socio-
political conditions which existed in the country in the early seventeenth century 
not only affected diplomatic and commercial relations, but through the process 
of personal acculturation they had the potential to deeply impact the perceptions 
and responses of Britons who sojourned there. Harrison’s perceptions, particularly 
of Islam and Islamic government, were informed by what he observed and heard 
during his visits: bloody disputes over control of territory and resources, and 
propaganda bruited by partisan interests. He interpreted his personal interactions, 
events he experienced, and stories which he was told through the filter of his strong 
Protestant faith and millenarian beliefs. But he also manifested responses which 
reveal tensions arising from his adherence to more fundamental Christian and 
humanistic convictions, and, more generally, his disposition, ideas, and actions 
also reflect the deep anxieties commonly felt by Europeans in his particular age.113 
Notably, religious and ethnological differences with the indigenes elicited 
little critical attention from Harrison, aside from his sympathetic observations 
accompanied the tumultuous period of ideological and social change associated with what has 
been characterized as a ‘general crisis’ in Europe during the seventeenth century. See Theodore 
K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), pp. 51–52.
112  On contemporary thinking concerning monarchical legitimacy and associated 
developments leading up to the English Civil War, see Robert Zaller, The Discourse of Legitimacy 
in Early Modern England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), esp. ch. 7.
113  On these anxieties, see Rabb, Struggle for Stability, p. 4.
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about Jews and Moriscos, and his traditionally framed critique of Islam; in fact, he 
tended to direct any prejudice he held toward specific individuals rather than apply 
such feelings more generally. If anything, he appeared to be unconcerned by such 
differences, as demonstrated by the close relationships he developed in Morocco 
with a variety of people from different ethnic backgrounds. Like his compatriots 
operating elsewhere in the Mediterranean region, he manifested a significant 
degree of pragmatism and adaptability in his inter-cultural encounters.114
It has been argued by one scholar that the proposals developed by Harrison 
for the acquisition of enclaves in Morocco were the products of British imperial 
aspiration and represent a change in national ideology from a focus on trade to 
conquest of land and control of natural resources.115 However, rather than being 
considered evidence of a new imperial ideology Harrison’s plans should be seen as 
the initiatives of a particular man operating within a specific set of circumstances. 
This is certainly borne out by the lack of enthusiasm with which they were 
received back in England. In any event, they can better be regarded as renderings 
of a more traditional understanding of a colony as ‘the plantation of nucleated 
settlements within a foreign landscape’, rather than of the ‘exploitation and 
cultural domination’ that are implicit in the much later concept of ‘colonialism’.116
Renewed interest in the Mediterranean and the activity of Britons in the region 
in the early modern period is providing new insights into inter-cultural encounters 
and the impact that such engagement had on development of the British empire 
and British self-identity. In this article, I have attempted to examine the effect of 
acculturation on one early modern Briton to demonstrate the utility of attention to 
these processes in better understanding the responses of his compatriots arising 
from such encounters during a period of major expansion of England’s trading 
networks and increasing contact with non-European peoples. 
Attention to the influence of acculturation forces us to think beyond 
simplistic generalized notions of cause and effect and, rather, focus more precisely 
on the individual dynamics of encounter and their consequences. The insights 
into acculturation provided by cross-cultural psychology draw the historian’s 
attention to the wider effects of cultural encounter; not just to its cognitive 
outcomes as reflected in acts of representation, but also to its sometimes more 
revealing affective and behavioural dimensions. They encourage the researcher to 
identify evidence of acculturation in narratives of encounter, and to consider their 
significance. Examination of these experiences through the lens of acculturation 
114  On the general behaviour of Britons in the Mediterranean around this time, see, for 
example, Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 
1560–1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 47, 51–53, 74–79, 290, 297–98. Colley, 
Captives, pp. 133–34, refers to the necessary ‘compromises and collusions’ which were imposed 
on the British in operating in the Mediterranean.
115  See Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 42–43, 45, 134.
116  David Armitage, ʻLiterature and Empire’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, 
i: The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, 
ed. by Nicholas Canny (1998), pp. 99–123 (p. 109).
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provides another perspective from which to read and analyse historical sources, 
to attempt to understand the meaning of encounter and identify the reasons for 
differences in the responses between people.
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